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Abstract
Economic disruptions (techonological change, trade liberalization, immigration flows) generally
create winners and losers, i.e., wage gains for some individuals and wage losses for others. The
compensation problem consists of designing a reform of the existing income tax system that offsets
the wefare losses by redistributing the gains of the winners. We derive a closed-form formula for
the compensating tax reform and its impact on the government budget when only distortionary tax
instruments are available and wages are determined endogenously in general equilibrium. We apply
this result to the compensation of automation in the U.S. and Germany.
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Introduction
Economic disruptions, for instance an inflow of immigration, a change in technology
or an opening to international trade, generally create winners and losers, i.e., wage
and welfare gains for some individuals and welfare losses for others. The welfare
compensation problem consists of designing a reform of the tax-and-transfer system
that offsets the losses by redistributing the gains of the winners. We solve this prob-
lem in an environment where only distortionary taxes are available and wages are
determined endogenously in general equilibrium.
The traditional public finance literature (Kaldor [1939], Hicks [1939, 1940]) shows
that in an economy where individualized lump-sum taxes are available, the tax re-
form that redistributes the welfare gains and losses caused by a disruption simply
consists of raising (resp., lowering) the lump-sum tax liability of agents whose welfare
increases (resp., decreases) from the shock, by an amount equal to their compensating
variation. This standard Kaldor-Hicks approach is flawed, however. First, because
of asymmetric information (Mirrlees [1971]), the only tax instrument at the disposal
of the government, the labor income tax, is distortionary. Second, and most impor-
tantly, for many economic shocks it is crucial to model explicitly the endogeneity of
wages.
For instance, consider an inflow of low-skilled immigrants  i.e., an exogenous
(relative) increase in the total supply of low-skilled labor. In partial equilibrium,
i.e. if wages were exogenous, this would not affect individual utilities. In general
equilibrium, instead, this disruption lowers the wage of low-skilled workers whose
marginal product of labor is decreasing, and raises the wage of high-skilled workers
whose labor is complementary to the tasks performed by the immigrants (see, e.g.,
Card [2009]). Therefore, immigration flows have non-trivial welfare consequences
only because the endogeneity of wages is explicitly taken into account. Similarly, the
impact of automation on inequality can be understood as a race between education
 the supply of high-skilled workers  and technology (see, e.g., Katz and Murphy
[1992]). In both of these examples, movements in relative wages are fundamentally
determined by movements in the relative labor supplies of different skills. As a result,
standard public finance models in which labor supply is endogenous but wages are
exogenous cannot properly account for the welfare implications of these disruptions.
Now suppose that in response to the disruption, the government implements a
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tax reform that aims at compensating the welfare of agents whose wage is adversely
impacted. Since the only available policy tools are distortionary taxes, such a reform
affects the agents' labor supply choices. By the exact same general equilibrium forces
as we just described, these labor supply adjustments impact individuals' wages, and
hence their utility. These welfare effects need to be themselves accounted for and com-
pensated, using the distortionary tax code. Hence the combination of distortionary
taxes and endogenous wages leads to an a priori complex fixed point problem for the
compensating tax reform.
We start by analyzing the welfare compensation problem in a partial equilibrium
environment where wages are exogenous. We show that the design of the compen-
sating tax reform that brings every agent's utility back to its pre-disruption level is
simple, even when distortionary income taxes are the only available instrument. The
key insight here is that individual utility is only affected by the average tax rates
of the reform  that is, the changes in marginal tax rates do not impact welfare.
This follows from an envelope theorem argument: the marginal tax rate that the
individual faces affects his indirect utility only through his optimal labor supply deci-
sion, so that the corresponding welfare effect is second-order. As a consequence, it is
straightforward to show that a suitably designed adjustment in the average tax rate 
namely, one that exactly cancels out the income gain or loss caused by the exogenous
disruption, regardless of the marginal tax rate changes that it induces  is sufficient
to achieve exact welfare compensation.
The analysis becomes significantly more complicated when distortionary taxes are
coupled with general equilibrium forces. In this case, despite the envelope theorem,
the endogenous changes in labor supply do matter for welfare, through their impact
on wages resulting from the decreasing marginal productivities and the production
complementarities. Therefore, in general equilibrium, because of the labor supply
responses that they generate, the marginal rates of the tax reform affect directly
the agent's utility, even conditional on the average tax rate change. As a result,
to determine the compensating tax reform, we must solve for its average and its
marginal rates simultaneously. This is the key difference with the partial equilibrium
environment and the main technical challenge of our paper.
Our first main result is to derive a closed-form formula for the compensating tax
reform in general equilibrium, in terms of elasticity variables that can be measured
empirically. This formula is valid for arbitrary marginal wage disruptions; that is,
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our tax reform compensates the first-order effects on welfare caused by a shock. Our
second main result is to derive a closed-form formula for the fiscal surplus, i.e., the
impact on government budget of the disruption and its compensation. Thus, our
analysis generalizes the traditional Kaldor-Hicks criterion and provides a simple test
to determine whether economic shocks or policies generate aggregate gains, in the
sense that offseting the individual welfare changes using only distortionary tax in-
struments is budget-feasible. More generally, the value (and not only the sign) of the
fiscal surplus provides a policy-relevant monetary measure of the aggregate welfare
gains or losses from the disruption.
We first show that the compensating tax reform features an element of progres-
sivity that departs from the simple partial-equilibrium policy. This is because, when
the marginal product of labor is decreasing, the compensation must be designed such
that the (typically, negative) welfare effects caused by the higher average tax rates
counteract the (typically, positive) effects caused endogenously by the higher marginal
tax rates (in addition to those caused by the disruption itself). Thus, agents who face
a higher average tax rate must also face a higher marginal tax rate. Ceteris paribus,
this naturally leads taxes to grow with income at a rate (of progressivity) that is de-
termined by the ratio between the labor supply and the labor demand elasticities, net
of the rate of progressivity of the initial tax code. Second, skill complementarities in
production generate additional indirect wage adjustments that also need to be com-
pensated. But the marginal tax rates of this second round of compensation generate
in turn further wage and welfare changes, and so on. We show that we can generally
solve this fixed point problem  formally represented by an integro-differential equa-
tion  by defining inductively a sequence of functions that each capture a round of
iterated compensation. Remarkably, if the production function is CES, we show that
this series boils down to a uniform shift of the marginal tax rates in addition to the
progressive reform derived above.
We finally propose a concrete application of our theory in the context of the
robotization of the U.S. and the German economies between 1990 and 2007. We use
Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017]'s data for the U.S., and Dauth et al. [2017] data for
Germany, which give the estimated impact of an additional robot per one thousand
workers on the wages of different skills  roughly the amount of automation observed
in the U.S. between these dates. The closed-form solution that we derive allows us
to easily evaluate the compensating reform quantitatively. We find that in the U.S.,
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an additional robot per thousand workers requires a progressive tax reform, where
the tax payment of agents at the 10th (resp., 90th) percentile of the wage distribution
decreases (resp., increases) by 110% of their income loss (resp., 125% of their income
gain) from the disruption. This represents a 2 percentage point decrease (resp., a 0.5
pp increase) in their average tax rate, and generates a positive $16 budget surplus
for the government. In Germany, workers at the 10th percentile should have their tax
bill reduced by 310% of their income loss, while those at the 90th percentile should
have theirs reduced by 150% of their income loss.
Related literature. Our theoretical analysis of Section 2 builds on Kaplow [2004,
2012] and Hendren [2014], who extend the Kaldor-Hicks principle to the case of distor-
tionary taxes in partial equilibrium. Our main contribution, however, is the analysis
of the general equilibrium environment in which wages are endogenous. Most closely
related to our general equilibrium framework, Guesnerie [1998], Itskhoki [2008] and
Antras, de Gortari, and Itskhoki [2016] study compensating tax reforms and the wel-
fare implications of trade liberalization within specific classes of distortionary taxes
and tax reforms  linear for Guesnerie [1998] and CRP (as in Bénabou [2002], Heath-
cote, Storesletten, and Violante [2016], Heathcote, Storesletten, Violante, et al. [2017])
for Antras, de Gortari, and Itskhoki [2016], who moreover use a CES technology.
While we do not consider a sophisticated model of trade, we solve the compensation
problem allowing for both general nonlinear tax schedules and nonlinear tax reforms,
as well as a general production function. More broadly, our model is within the
class of Mirrleesean economies in general equilibrium. Stiglitz [1982a], Rothschild
and Scheuer [2013], Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016] study optimal taxes in
this environment for a given production function. Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet [2015],
Guerreiro, Rebelo, and Teles [2017], Thuemmel [2018], Costinot and Werning [2018],
Hosseini and Shourideh [2018] characterize optimal income taxes, robot taxation, or
trade policies in the presence of disruptions. None of these papers address the com-
pensation problem, which is our main focus and leads to distinct economic insights.
Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016] characterize the incidence of nonlinear tax re-
forms in general equilibrium  they do not try to find the compensating tax change,
which is significantly more challenging as it requires solving not only for labor supply
changes in response to a given tax reform, but also for the tax reform itself. Lastly,
our application to automation relies on the empirical analyses of Acemoglu and Re-
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strepo [2017] (for the U.S.) and Dauth et al. [2017] (for Germany), who estimate the
impact of robots on the wage distribution.
Outline. In Section 1 we set up the model and define the welfare compensation
problem. In Section 2 we solve for the compensating tax reform and the fiscal surplus
in the standard partial-equilibrium Mirrlees framework, i.e., assuming that wages are
exogenous. In Section 3 we analyze a simple version of our general-equilibrium envi-
ronment, in which we make a number of functional form assumptions ensuring that all
the relevant elasticity variables are constant. These allow us to derive in the simplest
possible way the welfare compensating tax reform and analyze its economic implica-
tions. We calibrate the model and apply the resulting formula to the compensation
of automation in Section 4. In Section 5 we relax all the functional form assump-
tions and solve the compensation problem in our most general environment. Section
6 concludes with a discussion of the benefits of the compensation approach over the
standard optimal taxation approach. The proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
1 Welfare Compensation Problem
In this section we set up our general model and define the welfare compensation
problem. Our goal is to design a tax reform that compensates the gains and losses of
a given disruption of the initial equilibrium, and to evaluate its impact on government
budget (fiscal surplus).
1.1 Initial equilibrium
There is a continuum of measure one of individuals indexed by their skill i ∈ [0, 1].
In the initial (undisrupted) economy, agents i earn a pre-tax wage wi ∈ R+ that they
take as given. Without loss of generality we order skills so that wages wi are increasing
in i. Hence the skill index i ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as the agent's percentile in the
wage distribution of the initial economy.
Agents with skill i have the utility function ui (c, l) over consumption c and labor
supply l. They choose effort li, earn pre-tax income yi = wili, and pay the tax T (yi),
where the income tax schedule T : R+ → R is twice continuously differentiable.
Under standard assumptions on preferences, incomes yi = wili are strictly increasing
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in skills i, so that there are one-to-one maps between skills i, wages wi and incomes
yi in the initial equilibrium.
1,2 Their welfare Ui is given by
Ui = ui (wili − T (wili) , li) , (1)
where labor supply li satisfies the first-order condition
3
−u
′
i,l (wili − T (wili) , li)
u′i,c (wili − T (wili) , li)
= [1− T ′ (wili)]wi. (2)
There is a continuum of mass 1 of identical firms that produce output using as
inputs the aggregate labor supply Lj of each type j ∈ [0, 1]. The aggregate production
function is denoted by F({Lj}j∈[0,1]). In equilibrium, firms earn no profits, and the
wage wi is equal to the marginal product of labor of skill i. Letting F ′i ≡ ∂F/∂Li,
we have
wi = F ′i({Lj}j∈[0,1]). (3)
We finally denote government revenue by
R =
ˆ 1
0
T (wili) di. (4)
We define the local rate of progressivity p (yi) ≡ − yi1−T ′(yi)
∂(1−T ′(yi))
∂yi
of the tax schedule
at income yi as (minus) the elasticity of the retention rate (one minus the marginal
tax rate) ri = 1− T ′ (yi) with respect to gross income yi.
1.2 Wage disruption
We now define a disruption of the initial equilibrium (1)-(4).
1This is the case if agents have a common utility function u that satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees
condition. Importantly, because we focus on marginal perturbations, this ordering of wages need
not be preserved by the disruption and the tax reform.
2We assume that incomes yi belong to a compact interval [y, y¯] ⊂ R+ and have a continuous
density fY (·). We denote by E [·] the corresponding expectation.
3We assume that this equation has a unique solution.
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Wage disruption. A disruption can be caused by various exogenous shocks: e.g.,
a perturbation of the production function F (due to, say, technological change) or of
the distribution of aggregate labor supplies L = {Lj}j∈[0,1] (due to, say, immigration
flows). We denote by µwˆE ≡ {µwˆEi }i∈[0,1], where µ > 0 is a constant, the percentage
adjustment in the wage distributionw ≡ {wi}i∈[0,1] caused by these exogenous shocks,
keeping individual labor supplies fixed. Without loss of generality, µ is pinned down
by the normalization ‖wˆE‖ ≡ sup
i∈[0,1]
|wˆEi | = 1. Therefore the map wˆE = {wˆEi }i∈[0,1] is
the (infinite-dimensional) direction of the disruption, and the scalar µ parametrizes
its size.4 Formally, a change in the production function from F to F˜ and in labor
supplies from L ≡ {Lj}j∈[0,1] to L˜E ≡ {L˜Ej }j∈[0,1] implies that the wage of agent i
changes, on impact, from wi to wi(1 + µwˆ
E
i ), where
µwˆEi ≡
1
wi
[F˜ ′i(L˜
E
)−F ′i(L)], ∀i.
Tax reform. In response to the disruption, the government can implement an ar-
bitrarily non-linear tax reform µTˆ (·). Thus, the statutory tax payment at income y
changes from T (y) to T (y) + µTˆ (y).5
Perturbed equilibrium. In response to the wage disruption µwˆE and the tax
reform µTˆ , individuals optimally adjust their labor supply. In general equilibrium,
this further impacts their wage, which in turn modifies their labor supply decisions,
and so on. We denote by µwˆi and µlˆi the total endogenous percentage changes in
individual i's wage and labor supply between the initial and the perturbed equilibria.
Thus, the wages and labor supplies in the disrupted economy are respectively equal
to w˜i = wi(1 + µwˆ
E
i + µwˆi) and l˜i = li(1 + µlˆi).
Formally, the perturbed equilibrium is described by the following equations. The
4Since there are one-to-one maps between skills i, wages wi, and incomes yi, in the sequel we
denote the wage disruption incurred by agent i interchangeably by wˆEi or wˆ
E(yi). Throughout the
paper we focus on continuously differentiable functions i 7→ wˆEi on [0, 1].
5In Section 3 we assume that the tax reforms Tˆ that the government can implement are contin-
uously differentiable, bounded, with bounded first derivative. This defines a Banach space on which
the norm of a function Tˆ is given by ‖Tˆ‖ = sup
y∈R+
|Tˆ (y) |+ sup
y∈R+
|Tˆ ′ (y) |. Note that the normalization
of the tax reform (and, below, the endogenous wage and labor supply adjustments) by the same
scalar µ > 0 as the wage disruption is without loss of generality since we do not impose ‖Tˆ‖ = 1.
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perturbed welfare of agent i is given by
U˜i = ui[w˜il˜i − T (w˜il˜i)− µTˆ (w˜il˜i), l˜i], (5)
where (w˜i, l˜i) are defined by the perturbed first-order condition
−u
′
i,l[w˜il˜i − T (w˜il˜i)− µTˆ (w˜il˜i), l˜i]
u′i,c[w˜il˜i − T (w˜il˜i)− µTˆ (w˜il˜i), l˜i]
= [1− T ′(w˜il˜i)− µTˆ ′(w˜il˜i)]w˜i, (6)
and the perturbed wage equation
w˜i = F˜
′
i ({L˜j}j∈[0,1]). (7)
with L˜j ≡ L˜Ej + µlˆj. The perturbed government revenue is given by
R˜ =
ˆ 1
0
[T (w˜il˜i) + µTˆ (w˜il˜i)]di. (8)
1.3 Compensation and fiscal surplus
We can now formally set up the welfare compensation problem.
Compensating tax reform. We define agent i's compensating variation µUˆi by
the difference in utilities between the initial and the perturbed equilibria, normalized
by the (initial) marginal utility of consumption to obtain a monetary measure.6 That
is, µUˆi ≡ (U˜i − Ui)/u′i,c. The welfare compensation problem consists of designing a
reform Tˆ of the existing tax code that offsets the welfare gains and losses of the wage
disruption µwˆE. Hence, the tax reform Tˆ must be designed such that each agent's
compensating variation is equal to zero:
Uˆi = 0, ∀i ∈ [0, 1] . (9)
6A positive (resp., negative) value implies that an individual i benefits (resp., loses) from the
shocks. If the utility is quasilinear in consumption, it is the amount that agent i would be willing
to pay, after the wage disruption µwˆE and the tax reform µTˆ , in order to be as well off as in the
initial equilibrium.
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Fiscal surplus. We define the fiscal surplus Rˆ(wˆE) as the change in government
revenue induced by the disruption and the tax reform, i.e.,
µRˆ(wˆE) = R˜ − R. (10)
Marginal wage disruptions. Throughout the paper, we characterize analytically
the solution to the welfare compensation problem for marginal wage disruptions, i.e.,
as µ → 0. Thus, our exercise consists of designing and evaluating the fiscal impact
of a tax reform Tˆ that compensates the first-order welfare effects of a small wage
disruption in the direction wˆE.
Compensability and aggregate gains of a disruption. We say that a given
economic shock {wˆEi }i∈[0,1] is compensable if Rˆ(wˆE) ≥ 0. If this is the case, then it is
possible to reform the initial tax code T to reach a Pareto improvement.7 Conversely,
it is possible that a disruption generates strictly positive aggregate gains, both in
terms of gross incomes and government revenue, but that these gains are not com-
pensable (i.e., the fiscal surplus Rˆ(wˆE) is negative), if the labor supply distortions
that the disruption or the tax reform generate outweigh these gains. More gener-
ally, the value of the fiscal surplus Rˆ(wˆE), and not only its sign, carries important
information: it provides a metric that allows to compare, in monetary units, the ag-
gregate welfare gains (or losses) of different economic shocks. For example, suppose
that a given disruption (say, automation) generates more revenue, after implement-
ing the compensating tax reform, than another (say, an inflow of immigration). It
follows that the government can achieve a strictly better Pareto improvement from
the former shock.
Remark: a more general problem. It is natural to wonder what the compen-
sating tax reform would be if the government's objective were to compensate every
agent so that their welfare would be at least as large (rather than exactly as large)
as in the initial economy, i.e., such that U˜i ≥ Ui for all i in equation (5). To address
this problem, we can directly specify the non-zero welfare improvements (or losses)
Uˆi = hi ∈ R that one wants to achieve for each skill level. We then solve the compen-
sation problem by replacing 0 with hi in the right-hand side of (9). The corresponding
7For instance, the government can redistribute lump-sum the budget surplus.
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tax reform and fiscal surplus can then be straightforwardly derived following identical
steps as in the proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 and Corollaries 1, 2, and 3 below.
2 Compensation in Partial Equilibrium
In this section, we show that the solution to the compensation problem takes a simple
form in partial equilibrium, even when when taxes are distortionary. Suppose as
in Mirrlees [1971] that wages are exogenous, i.e., the marginal product of labor is
constant and skills are infinitely substitutable in production. Thus, the production
function is given by
F(L) =
ˆ 1
0
θiLidi, (11)
so that the wage wi is equal to the technological parameter θi in the initial equilibrium.
In this case, the wage disruption µwˆE generates no further endogenous adjustment
in the wage: wˆi = 0 for all i ∈ [0, 1], so that w˜i is simply equal to wi(1 + µwˆEi ).
We characterize in closed-form the solution to the welfare compensation problem,
i.e., the compensating tax reform Tˆ and the fiscal surplus Rˆ(wˆE), for marginal wage
disruptions. The proofs are gathered in Appendix A.
2.1 Labor supply elasticities
We start by introducing the relevant elasticity concepts. In Appendix A we give the
(standard) analytical expressions of the Hicksian (compensated) elasticity eS,ri > 0 of
labor supply of skill i with respect to the retention rate ri ≡ 1− T ′(wili), the income
effect parameter eS,ni < 0 with respect to the non-labor (lump-sum) income ni, and
the elasticity eS,wi of labor supply with respect to the wage wi. These variables are
respectively defined by:
eS,ri ≡
ri
li
∂li
∂ri
, eS,ni ≡ ri
∂li
∂ni
, eS,wi ≡ (1− p (yi)) eS,ri + eS,ni .
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From these variables, we can then define the corresponding labor supply elasticities
along the non-linear budget constraint,8 as:
{εS,ri , εS,ni , εS,wi } ≡
1
1 + p (yi) e
S,r
i
{eS,ri , eS,ni , eS,wi }. (12)
The labor supply elasticities eS,wi and ε
S,r
i differ from the standard elasticity with
respect to the retention rate, eS,ri , because a wage change or the initial labor supply
response to a tax change affect the marginal tax rate T ′ (wili) faced by the agent, if the
initial tax schedule is nonlinear, by an amount equal to the rate of progressivity p (yi)
of the tax schedule; this in turn causes a further endogenous labor supply adjustment
given by the elasticity eS,ri , leading to the correction terms p (yi) e
S,r
i .
2.2 Incidence of disruptions and tax reforms
To characterize the compensating tax reform and the fiscal surplus, we derive first-
order Taylor expansions around the initial equilibrium, as µ → 0, of the perturbed
equilibrium conditions (5)-(6) and government revenue (8).
Welfare changes. A Taylor expansion of equation (5) implies that the change in
the utility of agents i induced by the wage disruption and the tax reform is given by:
0 = Uˆi = (1− T ′ (yi)) yiwˆEi − Tˆ (yi) , (13)
where the first equality imposes that, once the new tax schedule is implemented,
agents i keep the same level of welfare in the disrupted economy as in the initial
equilibrium. This equation shows that, in partial equilibrium, the change in the
utility of agents i is due to:
(i) their exogenous income gain or loss yiwˆ
E
i caused by the disruption,
9 weighted
by the share (1− T ′ (yi)) that they keep after paying taxes (the first term of
(13));
8These labor supply elasticity variables are standard in the literature, see e.g. Jacquet and
Lehmann [2016]. They can be estimated empirically using, e.g., the methodology of Gruber and
Saez [2002].
9Recall that wˆEi is the percentage wage change, so that wiwˆ
E
i is the absolute wage change, and
li × (wiwˆEi ) is the gross income change.
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(ii) the change in their tax liability Tˆ (yi) (the second term of (13)), which makes
them poorer (resp., richer) if Tˆ (yi) > 0 (resp., < 0).
Labor supply changes. Next, a Taylor expansion of equation (5), which imposes
that the labor supply of agent i remains optimal in the disrupted economy, can be
expressed in terms of the elasticity notations introduced in Section 2.1 as follows.
The disruption and tax reform lead to a change in labor supply equal to:
lˆpei = ε
S,w
i wˆ
E
i − εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) − ε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi . (14)
This equation shows that agents i adjust their effort upwards if their wage increases
by wˆEi (first term in (14)), their marginal tax rate decreases by Tˆ
′ (yi) (second term),
or their average tax rate increases by Tˆ (yi) /yi. The magnitudes of these behavioral
responses are respectively determined by the elasticities with respect to the wage
(εS,wi ), the retention rate (ε
S,r
i ), and the non-labor income (ε
S,n
i ) that we defined in
Section 2.1.
2.3 Compensating tax reform
Equation (13) immediately gives the tax reform Tˆ which ensures that, after reoptimiz-
ing their behavior, individuals remain as well off as before the wage disruption µwˆE.
Since there is a one-to-one map between skills i and incomes yi, we let wˆ
E(yi) ≡ wˆEi
and εS,x(yi) ≡ εS,xi for x = r, n, w. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the production function is given by (11). The tax reform
that compensates a marginal wage disruption in the direction wˆE is given by
Tˆ (y) = (1− T ′ (y)) y wˆE (y) . (15)
Equation (15) implies that if wages are exogenous, the compensating tax reform
consists of increasing or decreasing the average tax rate (ATR) Tˆ (yi)
yi
of each agent i by
an amount equal to their net-of-tax wage gain or loss resulting from the disruption,
(1− T ′ (yi)) wˆEi . This makes them just as well off as if the disruption had not occurred.
Taking stock. The crucial feature that allowed us to easily solve for the compen-
sating tax reform Tˆ is that the changes in marginal tax rates (MTR), Tˆ ′ (yi), do not
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enter equation (13) and therefore do not matter for welfare (conditional on the total
tax bill change Tˆ (yi)). This follows from the envelope theorem: the MTR that an
individual faces affect his utility only through his labor supply decision (equation
(2)); but since labor supply is initially chosen optimally, these behavioral responses
induce no first-order effect on welfare. As a result, it is sufficient to adjust every
agent's total tax payment (or the ATR) to neutralize the income gain or loss due to
the wage disruption (1− T ′ (yi)) wˆEi , regardless of the changes in MTR Tˆ ′ (yi) that
such a reform implies.
2.4 Fiscal surplus
We now derive the fiscal surplus Rˆ(wˆE), i.e., the change in government revenue (4)
caused by the wage disruption and the compensating tax reform (15). It is decreasing
in the deadweight loss induced by the compensating tax reform, which is determined
by the individual labor supply adjustments (14) and hence by the marginal tax rate
changes. Differentiating (15) implies that Tˆ
′(y)
1−T ′(y) = [1− p (y) + ψˆE (y)]wˆE (y), where
the elasticity ψˆE (y) ≡ y
wˆE(y)
dwˆE(y)
dy
measures the local variation of the exogenous wage
disruption along the income distribution.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the production function is given by (11). The fiscal surplus
generated by the wage disruption wˆE and the compensating tax reform (15) is given
by
Rˆ(wˆE) = E
[{
1− T ′ (y) εS,r (y) ψˆE (y)
}
y wˆE (y)
]
. (16)
Corollary (1) provides a closed-form expression that allows us to determine whether
a given economic shock {wˆEi }i∈[0,1] is compensable, i.e., Rˆ(wˆE) ≥ 0. Note, in partic-
ular, that calculating the fiscal surplus (or, equivalently, the aggregate welfare gains
or losses of the disruption wˆE) does not require actually implementing or even com-
puting the actual compensating tax reform (15). Indeed, the expression for Rˆ(wˆE)
in (16) depends only on the exogenous disruption and the characteristics (tax rates,
income distribution, labor supply elasticities) of the initial (undisrupted) economy.
Conclusion. Proposition 1 and Corollary (1) are the first step towards generalizing
the standard Kaldor-Hicks criterion to the environment where type-specific lump-sum
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taxes are unavailable. The rest of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the case
where general equilibrium effects are present.
3 Compensation in General Equilibrium with Con-
stant Elasticities
We now characterize the compensating tax reform and the fiscal surplus when wages
are endogenous. We start by presenting a very simple version of the general-equilibrium
framework, which allows us to derive most transparently our main result  namely,
a closed-form formula for the compensating tax reform and for the fiscal surplus of
any marginal wage disruption. Specifically, we make several assumptions which en-
sure that the relevant behavioral and price elasticities are constant. The proofs and
technical details are gathered in Appendix B. We relax these assumptions and solve
the fully general model in Section 5.
3.1 Simplifying assumptions
We impose the following assumptions.10
Assumption 1 (CEL). The utility function is quasilinear in consumption with an
isoelastic disutility of labor effort: for some e > 0 and all i ∈ [0, 1], ui (c, l) = c− l1+
1
e
1+ 1
e
.
Assumption 2 (CRP). The labor income tax schedule has a constant rate of pro-
gressivity: for some p ∈ (−∞, 1) and τ ∈ R, T (y) = y − 1−τ
1−py
1−p.
Assumption 3 (CES). The production function has a constant elasticity of substi-
tution between skills: for some εD > 0 and θj > 0, F(L) = [
´ 1
0
θjL
1−1/εD
j dj]
εD/(εD−1).
Crucially, Assumptions 2 and 3 are only about the initial (undisrupted) economy.
We do not impose that they remain satisfied after the disruption and the compensat-
ing tax reform. That is, we allow the production function and the tax schedule to be
perturbed in arbitrary (non-CES and non-CRP) ways.
10Assumption 1 is standard in the taxation literature: see, e.g., Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz [2012]
for supporting evidence. Assumptions 2 and 3 are those made by Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante [2016], who show in particular that a CRP tax schedule closely approximates the U.S. tax-
and-transfer system. The CES production function is equivalent to a setting as in Costinot and
Vogel [2010] with a CES technology over tasks (e.g., manual, routine, abstract, etc.) to which
worker skills are assigned, except that the assignment of skills to tasks remains fixed (e.g., there is
a small switching cost) in response to a marginal disruption and tax reform.
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3.2 Labor demand elasticities
We define the elasticity of the wage wi of skill i with respect to the aggregate labor
Lj of skill j. The cross-wage elasticities γij and own-wage elasticities ε
D
j are defined
by:
Lj
wi
∂wi
∂Lj
= γij − 1
εDj
δ (i− j) , (17)
where δ (·) is the Dirac delta function. To understand this definition, consider first
the case where i 6= j, so that (17) reads γij = Ljwi ∂wi∂Lj . It is straightforward to show
that, when the production function is CES, this cross-wage elasticity is equal to
γij =
wjLj
εDEy . This elasticity is positive, i.e., different skills are Edgeworth complements
in production. Moreover, it does not depend on i, implying that an increase in the
labor supply of type j raises the wages of all types i 6= j by the same percentage
amount  as a result, throughout Section 3 we simply denote it by γj. Second,
consider the case where i = j. Equation (17) implies that the map i 7→ Lj
wi
∂wi
∂Lj
is
discontinuous as i → j.11 That is, a change in the aggregate labor supply of type
i affects the wage of skill i by a strictly smaller (in fact, negative) amount than the
wages of other skills (even close neighbors) j 6= i, because the marginal product of
labor of skill i is decreasing. With a CES technology, the own-wage elasticity 1/εDj ,
or equivalently the inverse elasticity of labor demand, is constant across the skill
distribution and equal to 1/εD.
3.3 Incidence of disruptions and tax reforms
In general equilibrium, the initial wage disruption µwˆE generates additional endoge-
nous wage adjustments µwˆi, which in turn affect every agent's utility and choice of
labor supply. As in Section 2, we start by deriving first-order Taylor expansions
around the initial equilibrium (i.e., as µ→ 0) of the perturbed equilibrium conditions
(5) to (8).
Endogenous wage changes. A Taylor expansion of equation (7) implies that the
endogenous wage changes wˆi, expressed in terms of the elasticities introduced in
11The Dirac notation ensures that the Euler theorem holds:
´ 1
0
wiLi × Ljwi ∂wi∂Lj di = 0.
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Section 3.2, are given by
wˆi = − 1
εD
lˆi +
ˆ 1
0
γj lˆjdj. (18)
This equation has the following economic interpretation. A one percent increase in
the labor supply of individuals with skill i leads to a −1/εD percent change in their
own wage, because the marginal product of labor is decreasing. A one percent increase
in the labor supply of agents with skill j ∈ [0, 1] leads to a γj percent change in the
wage of type i through complementarities between skills in production.
Labor supply changes. A Taylor expansion of equation (5), which imposes that
the labor supply of agent i remains optimal in the disrupted economy, implies that
the disruption and tax reform lead to the following change in labor supply, expressed
in terms of the elasticities introduced in Section 2.1:
lˆi = ε
S,w[wˆEi + wˆi]− εS,r
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) . (19)
This expression is analogous to equation (14) obtained in partial equilibrium, except
that the relevant wage change is now the sum of the exogenous disruption wˆEi and
the general-equilibrium adjustments wˆi. Substituting for wˆi using equation (18) im-
plies that, in addition to the direct effects already present in partial equilibrium, the
adjustment lˆi in the labor supply of agent i is now also affected by those of all other
agents j, {lˆj}j∈[0,1], because of the cross-wage complementarities. We obtain:
lˆi = φlˆ
pe
i + φε
S,w
ˆ 1
0
γj lˆjdj, (20)
where φ ≡ (1 + εS,w
εD
)−1 and lˆpei is given by (14) with ε
S,n
i = 0. Equation (20) is an
integral equation in the labor supply changes of all agents. We show in Appendix
B that its solution {lˆi}i∈[0,1] as a function of the exogenous wage disruption function
wˆE and the tax reform Tˆ is given by:
lˆi = φlˆ
pe
i + φε
S,w
ˆ 1
0
γj lˆ
pe
j dj. (21)
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It has the same structure and interpretation as (20), except that the unknown labor
supply changes lˆj in the integral are replaced by their (known) partial equilibrium
expressions lˆpej . Therefore, the labor supply of agent i is directly affected by the
marginal tax rate changes of agents i (through lˆpei ) and j (through lˆ
pe
j and the cross-
wage complementarity γj) for all j ∈ [0, 1].
Welfare changes. Finally, a Taylor expansion of equation (5) around the initial
equilibrium implies that the (normalized) change Uˆi in the utility of agent i induced
by the wage disruption µwˆE and the tax reform µTˆ is given by:
0 = Uˆi = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi[wˆEi + wˆi]− Tˆ (yi) . (22)
where the first equality imposes that agent i keeps the same level of welfare in the
disrupted economy as in the initial equilibrium. This expression generalizes equation
(13), again replacing wˆEi with wˆ
E
i + wˆi. Substituting for this term using equation
(18), we obtain that, in addition to the two partial-equilibrium forces described in
Section 2, a third channel now impacts the compensating variation of the agent:
(iii) the endogenous changes lˆi and {lˆj}j∈[0,1] in the labor supplies of type-i and
type-j agents, by impacting the wage of skill i (equation (18)), have a first-
order impact on the indirect utility of agent i.
As we will see, this additional effect is crucial for the design of the compensating tax
reform.
Taking stock. We gather and discuss the results obtained so far. In contrast to
equation (13) obtained in partial equilibrium, (22) does not directly yield the solution
for the compensating tax change Tˆ (yi) as a function of the exogenous disruption
wˆEi . This is because the agent's utility is also affected by the endogenous wage
adjustment wˆi, which in turn is determined by the labor supply responses {lˆj}j∈[0,1]
(equation (18)). Therefore, despite the envelope theorem, the endogenous changes in
labor supply now have first-order effects on welfare (via their impact on wages). But
lˆj depends on the marginal tax rate changes Tˆ
′ (yj), through standard substitution
effects (equation (21)). Therefore, in general equilibrium and when only distortionary
tax instruments are available, both the average and the marginal rates of the tax
reform have first-order impacts on welfare. Specifically, a higher average tax rate
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at a given income y∗, Tˆ (y∗) > 0, implies a reduction in the welfare of agent y∗, by
directly making him poorer, just like in partial equilibrium (last term in equation
(22)). Moreover, in general equilibrium, a higher marginal tax rate at income y∗,
Tˆ ′ (y∗) > 0, leads to the following fiscal externalities:
(a′) a higher average tax rate for all incomes y > y∗, since Tˆ (y) =
´ y
0
Tˆ ′ (x) dx,
which reduces the welfare of these agents;
(b′) an increase in the welfare of agent y∗, who works less, as in partial equilibrium
(substitution effect, second term in equation (14)) and hence earns a higher
wage (decreasing marginal product, first term in equation (18));12
(c′) a decrease in the welfare of all agents y 6= y∗, whose wage decreases due to the
lower labor supply of agent y∗ (production complementarities, second term in
equation (18)).
Thus, the consequences of a given tax reform are much richer, and the design of the
compensating policy significantly more complex, than in partial equilibrium. Sup-
pose that the planner implements the tax reform (15) that would compensate every
agent's welfare in partial equilibrium. Through standard substitution effects, this
tax reform affects individual labor supplies and hence, through decreasing returns
and complementarities in production, the wage distribution. These lead to additional
first-order welfare effects that need to be themselves compensated. One can only do
so by further reforming the tax-and-transfer system, which implies further changes in
marginal tax rates, etc. Therefore, the combination of distortionary tax instruments
with elastic labor supply (whereby marginal tax rates affect labor supply behavior)
and general equilibrium (whereby labor supply decisions determine wages) leads to
a fixed point problem for the compensating tax reform. Formally, the tax reform Tˆ
is the solution to an integro-differential equation that we derive in Lemma 2 in the
Appendix. We derive and analyze the solution to this equation in Section 3.4.
12The fact that an agent is made better off from a higher marginal tax rate (conditional on a total
tax payment) follows from the same logic as the trickle-down result of Stiglitz [1982b] that implies
lower optimal high-income tax rates than in partial equilibrium. See Corollary 4 in Appendix B for
a formal result.
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3.4 Compensating tax reform
We now give a complete analytical characterization of the compensating tax reform
in response to any wage disruption in general equilibrium. For ease of notation, we
define the total wage disruption faced by agent i by
ΩˆEi = φwˆ
E
i + φε
S,w
ˆ 1
0
γjwˆ
E
j dj. (23)
In partial equilibrium, we have ΩˆEi = wˆ
E
i . In general equilibrium, Ωˆ
E
i accounts
for the full incidence of the initial shock (absent the tax reform) on the wage of
agent i, i.e., the direct impact wˆEi plus all of the indirect effects caused by other
agents' wage adjustments {wˆEj }j∈[0,1] via skill complementarities γj. Importantly, it
is possible that empirical studies that evaluate the impact of a disruption on the wage
distribution capture not only the direct effect of the disruption, {wˆEi }i∈[0,1], but also
all of the indirect effects due to the labor demand spillovers in general equilibrium;
this is the case, for instance, in our empirical application in Section 4. In this case,
the compensation formula we derive in Proposition 2 can be applied directly using
{ΩˆEi }i∈[0,1] as a primitive. Since there is a one-to-one map between skills i and incomes
yi, we denote by Ωˆ
E(yi) ≡ ΩˆEi .
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 2 hold. The tax reform that
compensates a marginal wage disruption in the direction wˆE is given by
Tˆ (y) = (1− T ′ (y)) y
[ˆ y¯
y
Π (y, z) ΩˆE (z) dz − λ
]
, (24)
where we let
Π (y, z) =
εD
φεS,rz
(y
z
)εD/εS,r
, (25)
and λ is a constant equal to
λ =
1
Ey
{
E
[ˆ y¯
y
yΠ (y, z) ΩˆE (z) dz
]
− E[yΩˆE (y)]
}
.
Formula (24) is a closed-form expression, as it depends only on the exogenous
wage disruption wˆE (or ΩˆE) and on variables that are observed in the pre-disruption
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economy: statutory marginal tax rates, elasticity of labor supply, and elasticity of
substitution between skills. Therefore it is straightforward to implement such a tax
reform in practice (see Section 4 for an application).
3.5 Economic analysis of Proposition 2
We start by giving a heuristic derivation of Proposition 2 and then provide its eco-
nomic meaning and implications.
Heuristic derivation of (24). To understand formula (24), we can easily show
(see Appendix B) that equations (18), (19) and (22) imply
Tˆ (yi)
yi
= (1− T ′ (yi)) ΩˆEi +
φεS,r
εD
Tˆ ′ (yi)− (1− T ′ (yi))φλ, (26)
where λ ≡ εS,r ´ 1
0
γj
Tˆ ′(yj)
1−T ′(yj)dj is a constant independent of i. As in Section 2, the
change in the ATR, Tˆ (yi)
yi
, must compensate the wage, and hence welfare, gains or
losses incurred by agent i. The first term in the right-hand side of (26), (1− T ′ (yi)) ΩˆEi ,
is the net-of-tax wage change caused by the exogenous disruption, already present in
partial equilibrium (equation (15)). The second term accounts for the fact that, in
general equilibrium, an increase in the MTR of agents i by Tˆ ′ (yi) reduces their labor
supply by φεS,rTˆ ′ (yi), and hence raises their own wage by
φεS,r
εD
Tˆ ′ (yi).13 The third
term accounts for the additional fiscal externalities caused by increases in the MTR
of agents j 6= i by Tˆ ′ (yj), which lead to reductions in their labor supplies and hence
in the wage of agent i through the complementarities γj.
14 Thus, the change in the
average tax rate must now compensate not only the wage disruption ΩˆEi , but also the
wage adjustments generated endogenously by the marginal tax rates of the reform.
As a consequence, the reform Tˆ satisfies the first-order ODE (26). We derive its
solution in closed-form using standard techniques to obtain equation (24).
13The scaling factor φ accounts for the fact that the marginal product of labor is decreasing, so
that the agent's initial labor supply adjustment (say, increase) εS,rTˆ ′ (yi) lowers his wage by a factor
1/εD, which in turn leads him to reduce his labor supply by a factor εS,w/εD, therefore dampening
his initial response by φ ≡ 1/[1 + εS,w
εD
].
14Note that if the production function is not CES, the cross-wage elasticities depend directly on
i, so that λ is no longer be a constant. This makes the analysis more difficult, since equation (26) is
then an integro-differential equation with non-separable kernel, rather than an ODE. We solve this
general case in Section 5.
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Balancing the ATR and the MTR. Equation (26) formalizes the key insight
that, in general equilibrium, both the ATR and the MTR of the tax reform affect
welfare and therefore have to be determined simultaneously: an increase in the former
(resp., the latter) lowers (resp., raises) the agent's utility, and the welfare compen-
sating tax reform must be such that the total effect of these two instruments exactly
cancels out that of the exogenous disruption. Suppose in particular that the gov-
ernment implements the partial equilibrium compensation (15). This tax reform is
constructed so that its average tax rates exactly compensate the wage gains or losses
of the disruption. While the implied adjustments in marginal tax rates can be ignored
in partial equilibrium (because of the envelope theorem), in general equilibrium they
lead to additional, and hence unintended, welfare consequences that need to be them-
selves compensated (second term in the right hand side of (26)). Namely, the welfare
gain created by a higher marginal tax rate Tˆ ′ (y) > 0 must be counteracted by a wel-
fare loss of equal magnitude via an increase in the average tax rate Tˆ (y)
y
> 0. These
joint adjustments in marginal and average tax rates tend to make the compensating
tax reform progressive, as we now describe.
Progressivity of the tax reform. To fix ideas, consider a disruption that does
not affect the wage of agents with skill i < i∗, and ignore for now the cross-wage
complementarities (so that λ = 0 in (26)). Suppose first that ε
D
φεS,r
= 1, i.e., ε
D
εS,r
=
p.15 Equation (26) then reads Tˆ (yi)
yi
= Tˆ ′ (yi) for all i < i∗. This requires that the
average and the marginal tax rates of the reform must exactly coincide: an increase
in the former (resp., in the latter) generates welfare losses (resp., welfare gains) of
the same magnitude. It follows immediately that the compensating tax schedule Tˆ
must be linear on [y, yi∗). More generally, the relationship
Tˆ (yi)
yi
= ε
D
φεS,r
Tˆ ′ (yi) implies
that the ratio between the average and the marginal tax rates must be equal to the
constant ε
D
φεS,r
= 1 + ε
D
εS,r
− p. This implies that the compensating tax reform satisfies
Tˆ (yi)
yi
∝ yεD/εS,r−pi for all i < i∗. Therefore, the tax reform is progressive on [y, yi∗) if
and only if ε
D
εS,r
> p. Intuitively, a higher MTR at income yi ∈ [y, yi∗) mechanically
raises the ATR of every agent with income yj > yi. This creates a utility loss that must
be compensated, in turn, by a further increase in the MTR at income yj, and so on.
This race between the MTR and the ATR leads to exponentially increasing average
15This follows from the definition of φ = 1/[1 + (1−p)ε
S,r
εD
] which implies ε
D
φεS,r
= 1 + ε
D
εS,r
− p.
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and marginal tax rates on [y, yi∗). The key parameter driving the progressivity of the
compensating reform is the ratio between the elasticities of labor demand and labor
supply, net of the rate of progressivity p of the pre-existing tax code. This is because
(the inverse of) this ratio determines the extent to which an increase in the marginal
tax rate raises the agent's welfare  it lowers his labor supply proportionally to εS,r,
which in turn raises his wage proportionally to 1/εD. Empirically, the inequality
εD
εS,r
> p is clearly satisfied, since we have p ≈ 0.15, εS,r ≈ 0.3, and εD ≥ 0.5.
Effect of the cross-wage complementarities. Finally, the skill complementari-
ties lead to a constant change (in percentage terms) in the retention rate of the tax
schedule: Tˆ
′(yi)
1−T ′(yi) = λ (1− p). We can easily show that this is equivalent to an in-
crease in the parameter τ of the baseline tax schedule T (y) = y − 1−τ
1−py
1−p by an
amount τˆ equal to τˆ
1−τ = λ (1− p). The last term in (26) therefore requires a uniform
percentage shift in the tax rates of the compensation in addition to the progressive
reform described in the previous paragraph.
3.6 Fiscal surplus
We finally derive the fiscal surplus Rˆ implied by the disruption and the tax reform.
Corollary 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 2 hold. The fiscal surplus generated
by the wage disruption wˆE and the compensating tax reform (24) is given by
Rˆ(wˆE) = E[yΩˆE (y)]+ εD
φ
E
[
T ′ (y)
(
yΩˆE (y)− φ
ˆ y¯
y
yΠ (y, z) ΩˆE (z) dz
)]
.(27)
Remarks analogous to those in Section 2 apply. In particular, a disruption wˆE is
compensable, and a Pareto improvement can be achieved, if Rˆ ≥ 0. Note also that
formula (27) is given only as a function of the exogenous disruption and hence does
not require calculating explicitly the tax reform (24).
4 Application: Compensating Automation
In this section, we show how our theoretical results can be implemented in an em-
pirical application: compensating the welfare consequences of robotization in the
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U.S. and the German economies.16 This exercise also allows us to evaluate the im-
portance of the general equilibrium effects that motivate this paper. Throughout the
analysis we assume that the economy is described by the model of Section 3. The
initial tax schedule is CRP with p = 0.156 and τ = −3 in the U.S. (Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante [2016]), and p = 0.128 in Germany (Kindermann, Mayr,
and Sachs [2017]). The production function is CES with εD = ∞ (partial equilib-
rium), εD = 0.6 (Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston [2013]), or εD = 1.5. We estimate
the labor supply elasticity using the data of Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017] and find
εS,r = 0.47, which is in the ballpark of empirical estimates.
Automation in the U.S. Using the 1990 and 2007 U.S. Census data, Acemoglu
and Restrepo [2017] have estimated the impact of one additional robot per thousand
workers17 on wages, employment, and hours worked. These estimates are obtained
by comparing people in the same skill cell but who reside in commuting zones with
different exposure to industrial automation. They include both the direct effects of
robots on employment and wages and any indirect spillover effects that might arise
because of a resulting decline in local demand; in other words, they estimate the total
disruption ΩˆE rather than the direct impact wˆE.
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the wage disruption 100 × ΩˆE (y) (i.e., the per-
centage change in the wage) along the baseline (1990) earnings distribution, as well
as the standard errors. Consistent with our theoretical analysis, we group agents by
wage deciles, so that the values of the wage disruption in the y-axis are those reported
in Figure 13 of Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017]. This figure shows that the change in
the wage due to automation is increasing with the agent's position in the income
distribution. The lowest wages in 1990 are reduced by 1.84%, while the 80th and
90th percentiles experience an estimated increase in their wage of 0.31% and 0.34%.
The solid blue curves in the right panel of Figure 1 and the left panel of Figure 2 give
the corresponding percentage changes in gross incomes yΩˆE (y) for each decile of the
baseline (1990) earnings distribution.
In the right panel of Figure 1, we plot the compensating tax reform Tˆ (dashed red
curve) obtained in the partial equilibrium environment (formula (15)). The partial-
equilibrium compensation tracks one-for-one the shape of the income gains and losses
16Costinot and Werning [2018] use the same data to compute the optimal robot tax, rather than
the labor income tax reform that offsets the welfare gains and losses of the disruption.
17This corresponds to the increase in robots observed in the U.S. between 1990 and 2007.
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(solid curve), correcting only for the fact that the initial tax schedule is progressive so
that gross income changes differ from net income changes. The 10th income percentile
($5,500 per year) have their tax bill reduced by $100 (i.e., 110% of their income loss),
while the 90th income percentile ($62,000 per year) face a tax increase of $160 per
year (i.e., 76% of their income gain).
Figure 1: Wage disruption (left) and Partial-equilibrium compensation (right)
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In general equilibrium, however, the large changes in MTR that the previous tax
reform generates would lead to sizable unintended first-order welfare consequences.
The left panel of Figure 2 plots the compensation in general equilibrium. The solid
(resp., dashed-dotted) red curves give the tax changes Tˆ (y) for εD = 0.6 (resp.,
εD = 1.5) in response to the disruption (solid blue curve). Since the tax change
at a given income y in formula (24) depends on the disruption affecting agents with
incomes larger than y and up to the top of the income distribution y¯, we need to make
an assumption about the disruption on incomes higher than the largest in our dataset
(about $60,000): we assume that they incur the same wage disruption as those who
earn $60,000, i.e., their wage increases by 0.34%. To compensate their income loss,
low-income agents get a tax rebate equal to $113 if εD = 0.6 (i.e., 111.9% of their
income loss) or $120 if εD = 1.5 (i.e., 118.9% of their income loss). To redistribute
their income gain, high-income agents face an increase in their tax payment equal to
$260 if εD = 0.6 (i.e., 124% of their income gain) or $198 if εD = 1.5 (i.e., 94% of
their income gain). The right panel of Figure 2 plots the corresponding changes in
the average tax rates induced by the reform, i.e. Tˆ (y) /y. The average tax rate on
low incomes is reduced by 2.1 percentage points (resp., 2.18 pp) if εD = 0.6 (resp.,
εD = 1.5), while that on high incomes is increased by 0.42 pp (resp., 0.32 pp). Finally,
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applying the formula of Corollary 2, we obtain that the disruption generates a fiscal
deficit per capita of −$37.3 in partial equilibrium and −$11.5 if εD = 1.5, and a fiscal
surplus of $16 if εD = 0.6.18
Figure 2: General-equilibrium compensation (left) and Average tax changes (right)
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Compensation (U.S.): Average tax rates
Note that the compensation of a disruption that primarily benefits high-income
agents is such that the tax increases must be front-loaded  e.g., in the left panel
of Figure 2, individuals between the first and the fourth deciles face a higher tax
payment increase (resp., a smaller decrease) than their income gain (resp., loss) caused
by the disruption. The remainder of the compensation is ensured by the fact that
their marginal tax rate also rises. This front-loading avoids the steep increase in
marginal tax rates between the 3rd and 4rd deciles (i.e., between $25,000 and $45,000)
that the partial-equilibrium compensation would create (right panel of Figure 1).
Moreover, the increase in tax payment at the top of the income distribution is larger
than the increase in income caused by the disruption, and larger than the partial-
equilibrium compensation. Again, this is because these agents also face an increase in
their marginal tax rate, which raises their welfare and compensates for the difference
between their larger tax bill and their benefit from automation. Therefore, while
optimal taxation analyses typically suggest that trickle-down forces imply lower
marginal tax rates at the top in general equilibrium (Stiglitz [1982b], Rothschild and
Scheuer [2013]), the compensation exercise by contrast requires higher marginal and
average tax increases on high incomes than in partial equilibrium in response to an
increasing wage disruption: the compensation at the 90th percentile is 1.6 times higher
once the general-equilibrium forces are taken into account.
18Recall that these numbers are for one additional robot per thousand workers; when more robots
are introduced, the compensation should be scaled accordingly.
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Automation in Germany. Next, we compute the tax reform that compensates
the effects of automation on the wages of manufacturing workers in Germany between
1994 and 2014 using the empirical estimates of Dauth, Findeisen, Südekum, and
Woessner [2017]. Contrary to Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017], they find that robots
caused wage losses for the whole population, and that these losses were larger for
higher-income agents. This difference between the two papers is partly due to the
fact that they use a different methodology: while Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017]
estimate a decile-specific effect of the population-wide exposure to robots (i.e., one
per thousand workers), Dauth, Findeisen, Südekum, and Woessner [2017] estimate
instead a single overall impact of exposure to robots that they then multiply by the
average change in robot exposure over the twenty-year period at each decile of the
distribution. They find in Column 6 of Table 7 that an increase of one additional
robot per worker reduces earnings by 1.0822%. Moreover, they estimate the exposure
to robots along the earnings distribution up to 500,000¿ and find that higher incomes
faced stronger exposure  and hence incurred larger income losses. The earnings losses
of each decile are represented by the dashed magenta curves in both panels of Figure
3.
The solid blue curve in the left panel of Figure 3 plots the compensation in partial
equilibrium, which mirrors the income loss induced by automation. In the right panel
of Figure 3, we plot the compensating tax reform in general equilibrium for εD = 0.6
and εD = 1.5. The tax rebate is larger than in partial equilibrium, and almost
everywhere larger than the income loss due to the disruption because marginal tax
rate changes are negative. If εD = 0.6, the bottom decile of incomes should have their
tax payment reduced by $286 per year (i.e., 310% of their income loss), while the top
decile should have theirs reduced by $776 per year (i.e., 152% of their income loss).
Finally, these figures imply reductions in the tax rates equal to 1.3 percentage points
at the bottom and 1.4 pp at the top. If εD = 1.5, the tax rebates are $172 (186%
of the income loss) and $585 (115% of the income loss) at the bottom and the top,
respectively.
5 Compensation in the General Model
In this section we relax many of the assumptions we made in Section 3 and derive a
closed-form generalization of formula (24) for the compensating tax reform.
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Figure 3: General-equilibrium compensation: Germany
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5.1 Initial equilibrium
Agents differ along two dimensions: their skill i ∈ [0, 1], as in the previous sections,
and their fixed cost of participating in the labor force κ ∈ R+. These two charac-
teristics can be arbitrarily correlated in the population. An agent with types (i, κ)
has idiosyncratic preferences over consumption c and labor supply l described by
ui (c, l)− κ I{l>0}, where the utility function ui is general (i.e., non-quasilinear) twice
continuously differentiable function that satisfies u′i,c > 0, u
′′
i,cc ≤ 0, u′i,l, u′′i,ll < 0, and
where I{l>0} is an indicator function equal to 1 if the agent is employed. If the agent
decides to work, he earns a wage wi, chooses labor supply (hours) li, earns pre-tax
labor income yi = wili, and pays a labor income tax T (yi).
19 If he decides to stay
unemployed, his labor supply is equal to zero and he earns the government-provided
transfer −T (0). Finally, he also owns an exogenous quantity ki of the economy's
total capital stock, which earns a pre-tax return r.20 Capital income is taxed at the
constant rate τ .
19As in Section 1, we order skills so that there is a one-to-one map between skills i and wages wi
in the initial equilibrium with tax schedule T .
20We impose that all agents with a given skill i, i.e. a given wage wi, own the same amount of
capital, which ensures that they all choose the same level of labor supply (conditional on working)
li, independent of their fixed cost of working. We can easily relax this restriction by assuming that
agents i who are employed in the initial equilibrium own a different amount of capital than agents
with the same skill i but who are not employed. However, if we allowed the level of capital (and
hence labor supply) to vary more generally with the fixed cost of working κ, a tax system that
consists of a labor income tax schedule and a constant capital tax rate would not be sufficient to
compensate the impact of arbitrary wage disruptions, unless individual preferences have no income
effects on labor supply.
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The maximization problem of agent (i, κ) reads
Ui,κ ≡ max
{
max
l>0
ui (ci (l) , l)− κ ; ui (ci (0) , 0)
}
. (28)
where ci (l) is defined by the budget constraint: ci (l) = wil−T (wil) + (1− τ) rki for
any l ≥ 0. Conditional on working, agent (i, κ) chooses labor supply li that satisfies
the first-order condition
−u
′
i,l (ci (li) , li)
u′i,c (ci (li) , li)
= [1− T ′ (wili)]wi. (29)
We assume that there is a unique solution li to this problem. Moreover, the agent
decides to participate if and only if his fixed cost of work κ is smaller than a threshold
κi, given by
κi = ui [wili − T (wili) + (1− τ) rki, li]− ui [−T (0) + (1− τ) rki, 0] . (30)
Denote by hi (κ) the density of κ conditional on skill i and by Li = li
´ κi
0
hi (κ) dκ the
total amount of labor supplied by workers of skill i.
Firms produce output using the aggregate labor supply Li of each type i ∈ [0, 1]
and the aggregate capital stock K, which we assume to be in fixed supply. The
aggregate production function is denoted by F ({Li}i∈[0,1] , K). We assume that F
has constant returns to scale. In equilibrium, firms earn no profits and the wage wi
is equal to the marginal product of type-i labor, i.e.,
wi = F
′
i ({Lj}j∈[0,1] , K). (31)
The equilibrium interest rate is equal to the marginal product of capital, i.e., r =
F ′K({Lj}j∈[0,1] , K).
The government levies taxes on labor and capital incomes. The initial labor
income tax schedule is twice continuously differentiable but is allowed to be arbitrarily
nonlinear. We restrict the initial tax schedule and tax reforms on capital income to
be linear.
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5.2 The welfare compensation problem
A wage disruption, defined as in Section 1.2, may be due to exogenous shocks to
the production function, the distribution of labor supplies, and the aggregate cap-
ital stock. We denote by µrˆE the corresponding disruption to the interest rate 
i.e., the difference between the marginal productivities of capital before and after the
shock keeping individual labor supplies fixed at their pre-disruption level. The gov-
ernment can implement an arbitrarily nonlinear reform µTˆ of the labor income tax
schedule, and a reform µτˆ of the capital income tax rate. In response to a disruption
(µwˆE, µrˆE) and a tax reform (µTˆ , µτˆ), individuals optimally adjust their labor supply
and participation decisions. In general equilibrium, this further impacts their wage
and the interest rate, which in turn affects again their labor supply choices, and so
on. We denote by µwˆi, µrˆ, µlˆi and µκˆi the total endogenous changes in individual i's
wage, interest rate, labor supply (conditional on working), and participation thresh-
old, respectively, following the disruption and tax reform. That is, in the disrupted
economy we have w˜i = wi(1 + µwˆ
E
i + µwˆi), r˜ = r(1 + µrˆ
E + µrˆ), l˜i = li(1 + µlˆi) and
κ˜i = κi+µκˆi. We finally denote by U˜i,κ = Ui,κ+µu
′
i,cUˆi,κ the resulting indirect utility
of agents with type (i, κ) in the final equilibrium. The welfare compensation problem
consists of designing the reform (µTˆ , µτˆ) of the tax system such that the welfare of
every agent is the same as it was before the wage disruption; that is, U˜i,κ = Ui,κ for
all (i, κ) ∈ [0, 1]× R+.
We start by proving that if the government implements the welfare compensat-
ing policy, then it must be the case that no agent switches participation status, i.e.,
κˆi = 0 for all i. Indeed, first note that we can choose to adjust the capital income
tax rate by τˆ
1−τ = rˆ, so that the net of tax return (1− τ) r, and hence the capital
income of each agent, remains constant. Thus, we can leave unchanged the welfare
ui[−T (0) + (1− τ) rki, 0] of agents who are unemployed both before and after the
perturbation by keeping the unemployment transfer −T (0) unaffected. Moreover, in
order to leave unchanged the welfare of agents who are employed both before and
after the perturbation, the combination of the wage disruption and the tax reform
must make the utility U˜i ≡ ui[w˜il˜i − T (w˜il˜i) − µTˆ (w˜il˜i) + (1− τ) rki, l˜i] equal to its
initial value Ui for all i. Now, since the participation decision (30) of an individual
with skill i depends only on the difference between the utilities conditional on em-
ployment and on unemployment, we obtain that the participation threshold κi must
also remain constant for all i. That is, in order to leave everyone's welfare unchanged,
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the compensating tax reform must ensure that the individuals who were employed
(resp., unemployed) before the disruption remain so in the new equilibrium.21
The welfare compensation problem consists of constructing a labor income tax
reform Tˆ such that the welfare of each employed agent in the disrupted economy is
equal to their welfare in the initial equilibrium. As before, our goal is to characterize
analytically the solution to the welfare compensation problem for marginal wage
disruptions, i.e., as µ→ 0. The problem is a straightforward extension of (5)-(8). Its
formal statement and the proofs are gathered in Appendix C.
5.3 Compensation in general equilibrium
We now turn to the general-equilibrium model and follow the same steps as in Section
3. We define the cross-wage elasticities γij and labor demand elasticities ε
D
j by (17).
The endogenous wage changes are given by:
wˆi = − 1
εDi
lˆi
li
+
ˆ 1
0
γij lˆjdj. (32)
This equation generalizes (to the case of non-constant own- and cross-wage elastic-
ities) equation (18) in the simpler model of Section 3 and has the same economic
interpretation.
The change in the indirect utility of agent i induced by the wage disruption and
the tax reform (weighted by the marginal utility of consumption), Uˆi, is given by:
0 = Uˆi = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
[
wˆEi + wˆi
]− Tˆ (yi) . (33)
This equation generalizes (to the case of non-quasilinear preferences) equation (22)
in the simpler model of Section 3 and has the same economic interpretation.
The change in the labor supply of agent i is given by:
lˆi = ε
S,w
i
[
wˆEi + wˆi
]− εS,ri Tˆ ′ (yi)1− T ′ (yi) + εS,ni Tˆ (yi)(1− T ′ (yi)) yi . (34)
This equation generalizes (to the case of non-constant elasticities and non-quasilinear
21This implies in particular that the values of the elasticities of participation with respect to the
tax rates (which otherwise would matter to determine the endogenous wage adjustments wˆi) are
irrelevant for the construction of the compensating tax reform.
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preferences) equation (19) in the simpler model of Section 3 and has a similar economic
interpretation, except that labor supply now also adjusts in response to a change in
the average tax rate Tˆ (yi) /yi by an amount given by the income effect parameter
εS,ni .
Using (32) to substitute for the endogenous wage adjustment wˆi in equation (34)
leads to an integral equation for the labor supply changes of all agents, {lˆj}j∈[0,1]. This
equation is analogous to (20) except that the variables φi, ε
S,w
i , ε
S,r
i , γij now depend
explicitly on i and that there are income effects. The following lemma, which follows
from Proposition 1 in Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016] and is proved in the
Appendix, gives the closed-form solution to this equation.
Lemma 1. Assume that
´
[0,1]2
| δiεS,wi γij |2 didj < 1.22 The solution to (34) is given
by: for all i ∈ [0, 1],
lˆi = φilˆ
pe
i + φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γijφj lˆ
pe
j dj, (35)
where lˆpei is defined by (14), φi ≡ 1/[1 + ε
S,w
i
εDi
], and Γij ≡
∑∞
n=0 Γ
(n)
ij with Γ
(0)
ij = γij
and for all n ≥ 1, Γ(n)ij =
´ 1
0
Γ
(n−1)
ik φkε
S,w
k γkjdk.
Equation (35) shows that the percentage change in the labor supply of type i,
lˆi, is the sum of two terms. The first, lˆ
pe
i , is the partial-equilibrium expression (14),
weighted by φi. This scaling factor accounts for the fact that the marginal product of
labor is decreasing, so that the agent's initial labor supply adjustment (say, increase)
lˆpei lowers his wage by a factor 1/ε
D
i , which in turn leads him to reduce his labor
supply by a factor εS,wi /ε
D
i , therefore dampening his initial response by φi. The
second term in (14) accounts for the fact that the wage disruption and the tax reform
also lead to percentage increases φj lˆ
pe
j in the labor supplies of agents of type j 6= i.
These responses impact the wage of agent i by Γijφj lˆ
pe
j , where Γij captures the total
elasticity of the wage of skill i with respect to the labor supply of type j. This
total cross-wage elasticity, defined by a series
∑∞
n=0 Γ
(n)
ij , contains the direct effect
Γ
(0)
ij = γij, as well as the infinite sequence of feedback cross-wage effects between
skills j and i that occur in general equilibrium: for each n ≥ 1, Γ(n)ij accounts for the
22This condition ensures that the series defining Γij converges. The assumptions made in Section
3 provide sufficient conditions on primitives such that it is satisfied.
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impact of lj on wi via the wage and hence labor supply adjustments of n intermediate
types  e.g., for n = 1, lj
γkj−→ wk ε
S,w
k−→ lk γik−→ wi.23
Taking stock. As in the simpler model of Section 3, individual welfare is now
affected both by the average tax rates and the marginal tax rates  as a result,
equation (33) does not directly lead to a formula for the compensating tax reform:
we need to solve for the fixed point between the average and marginal tax rates of the
compensation. Suppose, to simplify the discussion, that the cross-wage elasticities
γij are positive for all i 6= j. A higher average tax rate at income y∗, Tˆ (y∗) > 0,
implies:24
(a) a reduction in welfare of agent y∗, by directly making him poorer, as in partial
equilibrium (third term in equation (33));
(b) a reduction in welfare of agent y∗, by making him work more (income effect,
third term in (14)) and hence earn a lower wage (decreasing marginal product,
first term in (32));25
(c) an increase in welfare of all agents y 6= y∗, whose wage increases due to the
higher labor supply of agent y∗ (production complementarities, second term in
(32)).
Moreover, a higher marginal tax rate at income y∗, Tˆ ′ (y∗) > 0, has the same conse-
quences (a′), (b′), and (c′) as described in Section 3.3. The compensation must take
into account all of these effects of taxes on individual welfare that arise in general
equilibrium. The non-constant elasticities and the presence of income effects make
the construction of this tax reform more difficult than in the environment of Section
3.
23See Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016] for details.
24We ignore the effects of the changes in the average and marginal tax rates on wages and welfare
through agents' participation decisions, since we argued above that no agent switches participation
status if the government implements the correct compensating reform.
25Because the cross-wage elasticities γij , and hence Γij , are positive, the wage and welfare of agent
y∗ are still reduced after taking into account the second, third, etc. rounds of general equilibrium
spillovers. This follows from equation (47) in the Appendix. The same reasoning applies for the
next bullet point. See Corollary 4 in Appendix B for a formal proof.
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Main result. The next result, which generalizes Proposition 2, gives an analytical
characterization of the compensating tax reform in response to any wage disruption
in general equilibrium.26 The total wage disruption faced by agent i is now defined
as
ΩˆEi = φiwˆ
E
i + φi
ˆ 1
0
Γijφjε
S,w
j wˆ
E
j dj. (36)
It accounts for the full incidence of the initial shock on wages and has the same
interpretation as (23) in the simpler environment (in which we have Γij = φ
−1
j γj).
Proposition 3. Consider a marginal disruption of the wage distribution w in the di-
rection wˆE = {wˆEi }i∈[0,1]. The following tax reform Tˆ solves the welfare compensation
problem: for all i,
Tˆ (y) = (1− T ′ (y)) y
ˆ y¯
y
Π (y, z)
[
ΩˆEz +
ˆ y¯
y
Λ (z, x) ΩˆE (x) dx
]
dz, (37)
where we let
Π (y, z) ≡ ε
D (z)
φ (z) εS,r (z) z
e
− ´ zy 1εS,r(x) [εD(x)+2εS,n(x)]dxx , (38)
and where Λ (y, z) ≡∑∞n=0 Λ(n) (y, z) with
Λ(0) (y, z) = φ (y) Γ (y, z) εD (z)−
ˆ z
y
φ (y) Γ (y, x) εD (x) Π (x, z) dx, (39)
and for all n ≥ 1,
Λ(n) (y, z) =
ˆ y¯
y
Λ(n−1) (y, x)φ (x) Λ(0) (x, z) dx.
Analogously to equation (24), formula (37) features two main departures from
the partial-equilibrium compensation (15). First, the progressivity variable Π is a
direct generalization of the corresponding term in (25), and has the same interpre-
26As usual, since there is a one-to-one map between types i and incomes yi, we can change variables
and index by income the wages w (yi) ≡ wi, wage disruptions wˆE (yi) ≡ wˆEi and ΩˆE (yi) ≡ wˆEi , and
elasticities εS,x (yi) ≡ εS,xi for x ∈ {r, w, n}, εD (yi) ≡ εDi , φ (yi) ≡ φi, and γ (yi, yj) ≡ γij/y′j ,
Γ (yi, yj) ≡ Γij/y′j , where y′j ≡ ∂yj∂j .
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tation. Second, the integral in the square brackets of (37) accounts for the cross-
wage effects originating from the skill complementarities in production. It is more
complex than in (24). Indeed, the functional equation (26) is more involved when
the labor supply of type k does not have the same impact on the wage of different
skills, so that Γjk can depend arbitrarily on j. Our proof shows that for each k, the
welfare impact of these indirect wage adjustments is determined by the first term
Λ(0) (y, z) in (39), so that the total effect on type j is given by
´ y¯
y
Λ(0) (y, z) ΩˆE (z) dz.
This welfare change needs to be itself compensated using the tax schedule, thus
leading to the term (1− T ′ (y)) y ´ y¯
y
Π (y, z) [
´ y¯
y
Λ(0) (z, x) ΩˆE (x) dx]dz in (37). In
turn, the marginal tax rates of this second round of compensation generate fur-
ther wage and welfare changes for all of the agents. These again must be com-
pensated (third round of compensating the compensation), leading to the term
(1− T ′ (y)) y ´ y¯
y
Π (y, z) [
´ y¯
y
Λ(1) (z, x) ΩˆE (x) dx]dz in (37). The full sequence of tax
reforms that achieves the fixed point of the compensation problem is constructed by
defining inductively the sequence of variables Λ(n) (y, z) for all n ≥ 0, where each
Λ(n) (y, z) captures one round of iterated compensation.
Corollary 3. The fiscal surplus generated by the disruption and the compensating
tax reform is given by
Rˆ =
ˆ y¯
y
ρ (y)
[
ΩˆE (y) +
ˆ y¯
y
Λ (y, z) ΩˆE (z) dz
]
dy (40)
where we denote
ρ (y) =
(
εS,w (y) + εD (y)
)
T ′ (y) yfY (y) +
ˆ y
y
Π (z, y)
(
1− εD (z)T ′ (z)) zfY (z) dz.
6 Conclusion: Compensation Principle vs. Optimal
Taxation
The classic policy question of compensating winners and losers from an economic
disruption becomes quite involved when the environment features both distortionary
taxes and general equilibrium. At the same time, both of these considerations are im-
portant in many applied and policy questions (e.g., to compensate the adverse effects
of technical change or immigration). We provide a general closed-form formula for the
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design of the welfare-compensating tax reform in general equilibrium. This equation
has a clear economic meaning and is easy to implement in practical applications.
Our analysis does not nest general cases of multidimensional worker heterogeneity.
In particular, the disruptions we consider do not have heterogeneous effects within
income levels. In general, such multi-dimensional shocks could not be compensated
with a one-dimensional income tax instrument. We can easily add tags and imple-
ment tax reforms that target some, say, sectors or occupations rather than others,
as long as there is no endogenous switching between sectors. In its full generality,
however, the multi-dimensional compensation problem would require richer policy
instruments than a simple labor income tax schedule and is left for future research.
We conclude this paper by highlighting the advantages of the compensation ap-
proach, taken in this paper, over the more traditional optimal taxation approach
(see, in general equilibrium environments, Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet [2015], Rothschild
and Scheuer [2013], Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016]).27 First, the compensa-
tion approach is more tractable. We are able to derive a closed-form solution in
very general environments, while the optimal tax formula is much more complex and
must be solved numerically even in simple general-equilibrium settings. Second, our
formula depends only on the evaluation of sufficient statistics (elasticities, income
distribution) in the current, pre-disruption, economy rather than in a fictional econ-
omy where the optimal tax schedule would already be implemented; it can thus be
directly applied using current data. Moreover, the policy response to a given eco-
nomic disruption is given by a reform of the actual (e.g., U.S.) tax schedule, rather
than of the optimal one, which was not implemented in the first place  this makes
our insights more directly policy-relevant. Finally, the compensation approach allows
Pareto comparisons, so no position on a social welfare function must be taken  our
formula depends only on variables that are measurable empirically and does not rely
on interpersonal comparisons of welfare. We believe that these benefits make the
compensation problem a fruitful alternative to optimal taxation.
27Of course, by discussing the benefits of the compensation approach, we do not mean to
claim that it is always superior to the optimum approach. Fundamentally, they answer different
questions.
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A Proofs of Sections 2
Proof of equation (13). The change in utility of agent i in response to the disruption and
tax reform is given by:
U˜i − Ui = ui[w˜i l˜i − T (w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ (w˜i l˜i), l˜i]− ui [wili − T (wili) , li]
where w˜i = wi(1 +µwˆ
E
i ) and l˜i = li(1 +µlˆi). A first-order Taylor expansion of this equation around
the initial equilibrium, i.e., as µ→ 0, yields:
U˜i − Ui = µ
[
(1− T ′ (wili)) (wili lˆi + wiliwˆEi )− Tˆ (wili)
]
u′i,c + µli lˆiu
′
i,l + o (µ) , (41)
Using the fact that (1− T ′ (wili))wili lˆiu′i,c+ li lˆiu′i,l = 0, which follows from the first-order condition
(2) or from the envelope theorem, leads to (13).
Proof of equation (14). The perturbed first-order condition of agent i in response to the
disruption and tax reform is given by:
0 = [1− T ′(w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ ′(w˜i l˜i)]w˜iu′i,c[w˜i l˜i − T (w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ (w˜i l˜i) +Rki, l˜i]
+u′i,l[w˜i l˜i − T (w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ (w˜i l˜i) +Rki, l˜i].
A first-order Taylor expansion of this equation around the initial equilibrium, i.e., as µ→ 0, gives:
0 =
[
(1− T ′ (yi))2 wiliu′′i,cc + (1− T ′ (yi)) liu′′i,cl + (1− T ′ (yi))u′i,c − wiliT ′′ (yi)u′i,c
]
wiwˆ
E
i
+
[
(1− T ′ (yi))2 w2i u′′i,cc + 2 (1− T ′ (yi))wiu′′i,cl + u′′i,ll − w2i T ′′ (yi)u′i,c
]
li lˆi
−wiu′i,cTˆ ′ (yi)−
[
(1− T ′ (yi))wiu′′i,cc + u′′i,cl
]
Tˆ (yi) .
The Hicksian (compensated) labor supply elasticity eci and the income effect parameter e
n
i are
respectively equal to (see, e.g., Saez [2001] p. 227):
eci =
u′i,l
li(
u′i,l
u′i,c
)2
u′′i,cc − 2
(
u′i,l
u′i,c
)
u′′i,cl + u
′′
i,ll
, eni =
−
(
u′i,l
u′i,c
)2
u′′i,cc +
(
u′i,l
u′i,c
)
u′′i,cl(
u′i,l
u′i,c
)2
u′′i,cc − 2
(
u′i,l
u′i,c
)
u′′i,cl + u
′′
i,ll
. (42)
Solving the previous equation for lˆi then implies
lˆi =
(1− pi) eci + eni
1 + p (yi) eci
wˆEi −
eci
1 + p (yi) eci
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
eni
1 + p (yi) eci
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi .
Using the definitions of the elasticities along the nonlinear budget constraint εS,ri , ε
S,n
i , ε
S,w
i leads to
equation (14).
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Proof of Proposition 1. Equation (15) follows immediately from (13) and a change of vari-
ables from skills i to incomes yi.
Proof of Corollary 1. The effect of the wage disruption and the corresponding compensating
tax reform on government budget is given by
Rˆ(wˆE) = lim
µ→0
1
µ
{ˆ 1
0
[
T (w˜i l˜i) + µTˆ (w˜i l˜i)
]
di−
ˆ 1
0
T (wili) di
}
,
A first-order Taylor expansion around the initial equilibrium implies that this expression is equal to:
Rˆ(wˆE) =
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (wili) di+
ˆ 1
0
[wˆEi + lˆi]wiliT
′ (wili) di,
Using equation (15), we can rewrite this expression as
Rˆ(wˆE) =
ˆ 1
0
[wˆEi + T
′ (yi) lˆi]yidi. (43)
Now differentiate Tˆ (y) with respect to y in (15) to obtain the marginal tax rates of the reform.
Denoting by y′i ≡ dyidi , we obtain:
Tˆ ′ (yi) =
1
y′i
[
−y′iT ′′ (yi) yiwˆEi + (1− T ′ (yi)) y′iwˆEi + (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
dwˆEi
di
]
= (1− T ′ (y))
[
(1− p (y)) wˆE (y) + y dwˆ
E (y)
dy
]
.
Therefore, equation (14) can be rewritten as:
lˆi = ε
S,w
i wˆ
E
i − εS,ri
[
(1− p (yi)) wˆEi +
yi
y′i
dwˆEi
di
]
− εS,ni wˆEi = −εS,ri
yi
y′i
dwˆEi
di
,
where we used the fact that εS,wi = (1− p (yi)) εS,ri + εS,ni . Substituting into equation (43) and
changing variables from skills to incomes therefore leads to (16).
B Proofs of Section 3
Proof of equation (18). Consider an exogenous disruption µFˆE of the initial production
function and a tax reform µTˆ , with µ > 0 (the proof can be extended immediately to a disruption
of the aggregate labor supply distribution). The corresponding wage disruption is defined by
wˆEi =
∂FˆE
∂Li
({Lj}j∈[0,1]).
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Denote by µwˆi and µlˆi the first-order endogenous percentage changes as µ → 0 in the wage and
labor supply of type i, and let w˜i = wi(1 + µwˆ
E
i + µwˆi) and l˜i = li(1 + µlˆi). In the perturbed
equilibrium, the wage is equal to the marginal product of the labor of the corresponding type:
w˜i =
∂[F + µFˆE ]
∂Li
({Lj(1 + µlˆj)}j∈[0,1]).
A first-order Taylor expansion in µ → 0 of this equation around the initial equilibrium yields the
following expression for the Gateaux derivative of the wage functional:\hat{w}_{i}
wˆi ≡ lim
µ→0
1
µwi
[w˜i − wi − µwˆEi ]
= lim
µ→0
1
µwi
{
∂[F + µFˆE ]
∂Li
({Lj(1 + µlˆj)}j∈[0,1])− ∂F
∂Li
({Lj}j∈[0,1])− µ∂Fˆ
E
∂Li
({Lj}j∈[0,1])
}
.
This expression is equal to
wˆi =
1
wi
ˆ 1
0
lˆjLj
∂2F (L)
∂Li∂Lj
dj.
The cross-wage elasticities are given, for i 6= j, by
Lj
wi
∂2F (L)
∂Li∂Lj
=
Lj
wi
∂2
∂Lj
{
θiL
−1/εD
i
[ˆ 1
0
θjL
1−1/εD
j dj
] 1
εD−1
}
=
1
εD
θjL
1−1/εD
j´ 1
0
θkL
1−1/εD
k dk
=
1
εD
wjLj
F (L) ≡ γj ,
and the own-wage elasticities by
Li
wi
∂2F (L)
∂L2i
=
Li
wi
∂2
∂Li
{
θiL
−1/εD
i
[ˆ 1
0
θjL
1−1/εD
j dj
] 1
εD−1
}
= γi − 1
εD
1
wi
θiL
−1/εD
i
[ˆ 1
0
θjL
1−1/εD
j dj
] 1
εD−1
δ (0) = γi − 1
εD
δ (0) .
Hence we obtain
wˆi =
ˆ 1
0
lˆj
{
γj − 1
εD
δ (i− j)
}
dj,
which leads to equation (18).
Proof of equations (19, 20, 22). The proofs of equations (19) and (22) are identical to
those of equations (14) and (13) in Section A, except that we now have εS,n = 0 (by Assumption 1)
and w˜i = wi(1 + µwˆ
E
i + µwˆi) rather than w˜i = wi(1 + µwˆ
E
i ). Equation (20) is easily obtained by
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substituting for wˆi into (19) using (18) and solving for lˆi.
Proof of equation (26). Equation (20) is an integral equation in {lˆi}i∈[0,1]. To solve this
equation, multiply both sides by γi and integrate from 0 to 1 to get:
ˆ 1
0
γi lˆidi = φε
S,w
ˆ 1
0
γiwˆ
E
i di− φεS,r
ˆ 1
0
γi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)di+ φε
S,w
(ˆ 1
0
γidi
)(ˆ 1
0
γj lˆjdj
)
=
1
1− φεS,w ´ 1
0
γidi
{
φεS,w
ˆ 1
0
γiwˆ
E
i di− φεS,r
ˆ 1
0
γi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)di
}
.
Using the facts that
´ 1
0
γidi =
1
εD
and φ = 1/(1 + ε
S,w
εD
) to simplify this expression, and then
substituting for
´ 1
0
γj lˆjdi in (20), leads to
lˆi = φε
S,w
{
wˆEi + ε
S,w
ˆ 1
0
γjwˆ
E
j dj
}
− φεS,r
{
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + ε
S,w
ˆ 1
0
γj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj
}
.
This leads to equation (21). Note in particular that in the absence of a tax reform, the total labor
supply adjustment lˆi would be given by ε
S,wΩˆEi . Next, substitute for wˆ
E
i + wˆi in (22) using (19) to
get
Tˆ (yi) =
1
εS,w
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi lˆi + ε
S,r
εS,w
yiTˆ
′ (yi) .
Using the expression we derived above for lˆi, we get:
Tˆ (yi) = (1− T ′ (yi)) yiΩˆEi + φ
εS,r
εD
yiTˆ
′ (yi)− (1− T ′ (yi)) yiφεS,r
ˆ 1
0
γj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj.
Letting λ ≡ εS,r ´ 1
0
γj
Tˆ ′(yj)
1−T ′(yj)dj and changing variables from skills i to incomes yi in this equation
leads to (26).
Our analysis relies crucially on properly characterizing and accounting for the incidence of taxes
(both average and marginal) on individual utilities. Before deriving the compensating tax reform,
we characterize this incidence in an important special case that nests the model of Section 3.1.
Corollary 4. Assume that there are no income effects and that the cross-wage elasticities satisfy
γji ≥ 0 for all i, j. Then, for a given total (average) tax change Tˆ (yi) at income yi, a higher
marginal tax rate Tˆ ′ (yi) > 0 raises the utility of agents with skill i and lowers that of all other
agents. That is, Uˆi > 0, and Uˆj < 0 for all j 6= i.
Proof of Corollary 4. Suppose that γji > 0 for all i, j, which implies that Γji > 0 for all i, j.
(In the model of Section 3.1, we simply have Γij = φ
−1γj .) We then have, by equation (47), for any
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j ∈ [0, 1],
wˆj =
φjε
S,r
j
εDj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj) − φj
ˆ 1
0
Γjiφiε
S,r
i
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)di.
Since φjΓjiφiε
S,r
i > 0, a higher marginal tax rate Tˆ
′ (yi) > 0 at income yi lowers the wage, and
hence lowers the utility (conditional on the total tax change Tˆ (yj) at income yj), of type j 6= i.
This is because the higher tax rate lowers the labor supply of type i and the labor of type j is
complementary to that of type i in production. Moreover, since
φjε
S,r
j
εDj
> 0, a higher marginal tax
rate Tˆ ′ (yj) > 0 at income yj raises the wage, and hence raises the utility (conditional on the total
tax change Tˆ (yj) at income yj), of type j. The easiest way to show this is to consider a tax reform
at income yj only, i.e., Tˆ
′ (y) = δ (y − yj). We then have
wˆi =
φjε
S,r
j
εDj (1− T ′ (yj))
δ (0)− φjΓjjφjε
S,r
j
1− T ′ (yj) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We now solve the ODE (26). Since there is a one-to-one map be-
tween skills i and incomes yi, we denote by Ωˆ
E (yi) ≡ ΩˆEi and change variables to express (26) in
terms of incomes. The change of variables for the cross wage elasticities γj is given by:
γ (yj) ≡ γj
y′j
=
1
εD
yjfY (yj)
Ey
,
where fY is the pdf of incomes. Now, noting that 1/(φ
εS,r
εD
) = 1−p+ εD
εS,r
, the homogeneous equation
reads:
Tˆ ′ (y)−
(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
)
1
y
Tˆ (y) = 0.
Its general solution is given by
TˆH (y) = Cy
1−p+ εD
εS,r ,
where C is a constant. Using the method of variation of the parameter, we find a particular solution
of the form
TˆP (y) = C (y) y
1−p+ εD
εS,r ,
where the function C (y) is given by:
C (y) =
(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
)ˆ y¯
y
(1− T ′ (x))x−(1−p+ ε
D
εS,r
)
[
ΩˆE (x)− φλ
]
dx.
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The general solution to (26) is then equal to:
Tˆ (y) = TˆH (y) + TˆP (y) =
(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
)
(1− T ′ (y))
ˆ y¯
y
(y
x
)1+ εD
εS,r
ΩˆE (x) dx
−
1− (y
y¯
) εD
εS,r
 (1− T ′ (y)) yλ+ Cy1−p+ εDεS,r ,
where we used (1− T ′ (x)) = (1− τ)x−p = (1− T ′ (y)) ( yx)p. Denoting the constant D ≡ C1−τ +
λy¯−ε
D/εS,r we get
Tˆ (y) =
(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
)
(1− T ′ (y))
ˆ y¯
y
(y
x
)1+ εD
εS,r
ΩˆE (x) dx
− (1− T ′ (y)) yλ+D (1− T ′ (y)) y1+ ε
D
εS,r .
Finally, to find the constant λ, note that
yTˆ ′ (y)
1− T ′ (y) =
(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
)[
Tˆ (y)
1− T ′ (y) − yΩˆ
E (y) + φλy
]
=
(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
){(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
)ˆ y¯
y
(y
x
)1+ εD
εS,r
ΩˆE (x) dx− yΩˆE (y)
+ (φ− 1)λy +Dy1+ ε
D
εS,r
}
.
Using the expression for γj and the change of variables from skills to incomes,
λ ≡ ε
S,r
εDEy
ˆ y¯
y
yTˆ ′ (y)
1− T ′ (y)fY (y) dy
=
1
φEy
{(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
)
E
[ˆ y¯
y
(y
x
)1+ εD
εS,r
ΩˆE (x) dx
]
− E
[
yΩˆE (y)
]
+DE
[
y1+
εD
εS,r
]}
+
(
1− 1
φ
)
λ
=
1
Ey
{(
1− p+ ε
D
εS,r
)
E
[ˆ y¯
y
(y
x
)1+ εD
εS,r
ΩˆE (x) dx
]
− E
[
yΩˆE (y)
]
+DE
[
y1+
εD
εS,r
]}
.
Now suppose that the initial tax schedule T is Pareto optimal and that there is no disruption, i.e.,
ΩˆE (y) = 0. Imposing that the tax reform should be Tˆ = 0 in this case requires D = 0. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. Recall that the firscal surplus is given by
Rˆ =
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yi) di+
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi)
[
wˆEi + wˆi + lˆi
]
yidi.
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Substituting for lˆi using (19) and for wˆ
E
i + wˆi using (22), we can write
Rˆ =
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yi) di+
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi)
[(
1 + εS,w
) Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi − ε
S,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
]
yidi.
Using the ODE (26) to substitute for Tˆ ′ (yi) in this expression, we get
Rˆ =
ˆ 1
0
[
1 +
(
1− εD) T ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
]
Tˆ (yi) di− λεD
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yidi+
εD
φ
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yiΩˆE (yi) di.
Now, the definition of λ and the ODE (26) require
λ = εSr
ˆ 1
0
γj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj =
1
φEy
ˆ 1
0
yj
(
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi − Ωˆ
E (yj) + φλ
)
dj,
so that
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj =
ˆ 1
0
yjΩˆ
E (yj) dj.
Inserting this term into the formula for Rˆ above leads to
Rˆ =
ˆ 1
0
yiΩˆ
E (yi) di− εD
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) Tˆ (yi) di
−λεD
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yidi+
εD
φ
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yiΩˆE (yi) di.
Next, using the solution (24) to the ODE for Tˆ leads to
Rˆ =
ˆ 1
0
yiΩˆ
E (yi) di+
εD
φ
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yiΩˆE (yi) di
− ε
D
φ ε
S,r
εD
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi)
{ˆ y¯
yi
(yi
x
)1+ εD
εS,r
ΩˆE (x) dx
}
di.
This concludes the proof.
C Proofs of Section 5
The welfare compensation problem is characterized by the following equations:
Ui = U˜i ≡ ui[w˜i l˜i − T (w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ (w˜i l˜i) + (1− τ) rki, l˜i], (44)
45
where (w˜i, l˜i) are defined by the perturbed first-order condition
− u
′
i,l[w˜i l˜i − T (w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ (w˜i l˜i) + (1− τ) rki, l˜i]
u′i,c[w˜i l˜i − T (w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ (w˜i l˜i) + (1− τ) rki, l˜i]
= [1− T ′(w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ ′(w˜i l˜i)]w˜i, (45)
and the perturbed wage equation
w˜i = F˜
′
i ({Lj + LˆEj + µlˆj}j∈[0,1], K˜). (46)
Proof of equations (32), (33), (34). The derivations of these equations are analogous to
those of equations (18), (22), (19) above.
Proof of Lemma 1. This lemma follows from Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016]; for com-
pleteness, we give its proof here. Using equations (18) and (19), we obtain that the labor supply
adjustments {lˆi}i∈[0,1] satisfy the following linear Fredholm integral equation:
lˆi = ε
S,w
i
[
wˆEi −
1
εDi
lˆi +
ˆ 1
0
γij lˆjdj
]
− εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + ε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
= φi
[
εS,wi wˆ
E
i − εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + ε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
+ φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
γij lˆjdj.
Denoting the expression in square brackets by lˆpei , and substituting for lˆj in the integral leads to
lˆi =
φi lˆ
pe
i
li
+ φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
γij
[
φj lˆ
pe
j + φjε
S,w
j
ˆ 1
0
γjk lˆkdk
]
dj
=
[
φi lˆ
pe
i + φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
γijφj lˆ
pe
j dj
]
+ φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
[ˆ 1
0
γikφkε
S,w
k γkjdk
]
lˆjdj
≡
[
φi lˆ
pe
i + φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
γijφj lˆ
pe
j dj
]
+ φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γ
(1)
ij lˆjdj,
where Γ
(0)
ij = γij and Γ
(1)
ij =
´ 1
0
Γ
(0)
ik φkε
S,w
k γkjdk. By induction, it is easy to show that for all N ≥ 0,
lˆi =
[
φi lˆ
pe
i + φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
{
N∑
n=0
Γ
(n)
ij
}
φj lˆ
pe
j dj
]
+ φiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γ
(N+1)
ij lˆjdj
where for all n ≥ 0, Γ(n+1)ij =
´ 1
0
Γ
(n)
ik φkε
S,w
k γkjdk. The condition
´ 1
0
´ 1
0
| φiεS,wi γij |2 didj < 1
ensures that the series
∑N
n=0 Γ
(n)
ij converges as N → ∞. This implies equation (35). Finally, note
that we can write the endogenous wage changes as
wˆi = −φiε
S,w
i
εDi
wˆEi +
φiε
S,r
i
εDi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
φiε
S,n
i
εDi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
+φi
ˆ 1
0
Γijφj
[
εS,wj wˆ
E
j − εS,rj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj) + ε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
]
dj, (47)
46
which follows from equations (14), (19) and (35).
Lemma 2. Let τij ≡ (1−T
′(yi))yi
(1−T ′(yj))yj . The compensating tax reform Tˆ satisfies the following functional
equation: for all i ∈ [0, 1],
(1− T ′ (yi)) yiΩˆEi = −φi
εS,ri
εDi
yiTˆ
′ (yi) + φi
(
1 +
εS,wi
εDi
+
εS,ni
εDi
)
Tˆ (yi) (48)
+φi
ˆ 1
0
Γijτijφj
[
εS,rj yj Tˆ
′ (yj)− εS,nj Tˆ (yj)
]
dj.
Proof of Lemma 2. Equations (34) and (35) imply that the wage adjustments {wˆi}i∈[0,1] are
given by
wˆEi + wˆi =
1
εS,wi
lˆi +
εS,ri
εS,wi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
εS,ni
εS,wi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
= φiwˆ
E
i −
(φi − 1) εS,ri
εS,wi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) +
(φi − 1) εS,ni
εS,wi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
+φi
ˆ 1
0
Γij
[
φjε
S,w
j wˆ
E
j − φjεS,rj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj) + φjε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
]
dj.
Using this equation with φi−1
εS,wi
= − φi
εDi
, we can substitute for wˆEi +wˆi in the constraint (33) to rewrite
it as
0 = (1− T ′ (yi)) yiφi
[
wˆEi +
εS,ri
εDi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
εS,ni
εDi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
+ (1− T ′ (yi)) yiφi
ˆ 1
0
Γijφj
[
εS,wj wˆ
E
j − εS,rj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj) + ε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
]
dj − Tˆ (yi) ,
which leads to (48).
Proof of Proposition 3. Changing variables from i to yi in equation (48) leads to
Tˆ ′ (yi)−
(
εS,w (yi) + ε
S,n (yi) + ε
D (yi)
εS,r (yi) yi
)
Tˆ (yi) = − ε
D (yi)
φ (yi) εS,r (yi) yi
(1− T ′ (yi)) yiA (yi) ,(49)
where we denote
A (yi) ≡ ΩˆE (yi)− φ (yi)
ˆ y¯
y
Γ (yi, yj)φ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
[
εS,r (yj) yj Tˆ
′ (yj)− εS,n (yj) Tˆ (yj)
]
dyj (50)
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and the changes of variables imply
ΩˆE (yi) = φ (yi) wˆ
E (yi) + φ (yi)
ˆ y¯
y
Γ (yi, yj)φ (yj) ε
S,w (yj) wˆ
E (yj) dyj .
(In the sequel, we denote the arguments yi, etc. as indices for conciseness.) Equation (49) is a
first-order ordinary differential equation. Using standard techniques and the definition εS,wyi =
(1− p (yi)) εS,ryi + εS,nyi , we can express its general solution (up to a constant c0, equal to 0 if the
initial tax schedule is Pareto efficient) as
Tˆ (yi) =
ˆ y¯
yi
εDyj
φyjε
S,r
yj yj
e
− ´ yjyi
(
1−p(yk)+
εDyk
+2ε
S,n
yk
ε
S,r
yk
)
dyk
yk
(1− T ′ (yj)) yjA (yj) dyj
=
ˆ y¯
yi
εDyj
φyjε
S,r
yj yj
e
− ´ yjyi
εDyk
+2ε
S,n
yk
ε
S,r
yk
dyk
yk (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj (1− T
′ (yj)) yjA (yj) dyj
= (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
ˆ y¯
yi
Π (yi, yj)A (yj) dyj . (51)
where the second equality uses the definition p(yk)yk =
T ′′(yk)
1−T ′(yk) and integrates this expression. Using
(49) and (51), we can rewrite that auxiliary function A (·) as
A (yi) = ΩˆEyi − φyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjφyj
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
[
− ε
D
yj
φyj
(1− T ′ (yj)) yjA (yj) +
(
εS,wyj + ε
D
yj
)
Tˆ (yj)
]
dyj
= ΩˆEi + φyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjε
D
yjA (yj) dyj − φyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjε
D
yj
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj dyj
= ΩˆEi + φyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjε
D
yjA (yj) dyj − φyi
ˆ y¯
yj=y
ˆ y¯
yk=yj
Γyi,yjε
D
yjΠyj ,ykA (yk) dykdyj
where the second equality uses the fact that φyj (ε
S,w
yj + ε
D
yj ) = ε
D
yj . Inverting the order of the two
integrals in the last line implies that this expression can be rewritten as
A (yi) = ΩˆEi + φyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjε
D
yjA (yj) dyj − φyi
ˆ y¯
yk=y
{ˆ yk
yj=y
Γyi,yjε
D
yjΠyj ,ykdyj
}
A (yk) dyk
= ΩˆEi + φyi
ˆ y¯
y
{
Γyi,yjε
D
yj −
ˆ yj
y
Γyi,ykε
D
yk
Πyk,yjdyk
}
A (yj) dyj .
But this is a standard linear Fredholm integral equation, with kernel given by
Λ(0)yi,yj ≡ φyi
[
Γyi,yjε
D
yj −
ˆ yj
y
Γyi,ykε
D
yk
Πyk,yjdyk
]
.
48
Its solution is therefore known in closed form (see, e.g., Zemyan [2012]). Assume that
ˆ
[0,1]2
∣∣∣Λ(0)yi,yj ∣∣∣2 didj < 1,
which ensures the convergence of the series
∑∞
n=0 Λ
(n)
yi,yj defined in Proposition 3. This condition is
satisfied in the case under the assumptions of Section 3.1. Following analogous steps as in the proof
of Lemma 1, we get
A (yi) = ΩˆEyi +
ˆ y¯
y
{ ∞∑
n=0
Λ(n)yi,yj
}
ΩˆEyjdyj . (52)
From equations (51) and (52), we obtain the solution to the compensating tax reform problem
Tˆ (yi) = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
´ y¯
yi
ΠyiyjA (yj) dyj , leading to formula (37).
Proof of Corollary 3. The effect of the wage disruption and the corresponding compensating
tax reform on government budget is given by
Rˆ =
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yi) f (i) di+
ˆ 1
0
[
wˆEi + wˆi + lˆi
]
wiliT
′ (wili) di.
Using equations (19) and (35), the second integral in the right hand side can be rewritten as
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
(
1 + εS,wi
)
φi
[
wˆEi +
ˆ 1
0
Γijφjε
S,w
j wˆ
E
j dj
]
di
−
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
{
Eiε
S,r
i
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) +
(
1 + εS,wi
)
φi
ˆ 1
0
Γijφjε
S,r
j
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj
}
di
+
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
{
Eiε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi +
(
1 + εS,wi
)
φi
ˆ 1
0
Γijφjε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj dj
}
di,
with Ei ≡ ( 1εS,wi + 1)φi − 1/ε
S,w
i = 1− 1/εDi . Equation (48) implies that
−φi
ˆ y¯
y
Γijφjε
S,r
j
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj + φi
ˆ y¯
y
Γijφjε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj dj
= −ΩˆEi − φi
εS,ri
εDi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + φi
(
1 +
εS,wi
εDi
+
εS,ni
εDi
)
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi .
Tedious but straightforward algebra implies that the previous expression can thus be rewritten as
−
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
[
εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
(
1 + εS,wi + ε
S,n
i
) Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
di
=
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
[
εDi
φi
A (yi) +
(
1− εDi
) Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
di,
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where the second equality uses equation (49). Using the solution for Tˆ derived in (51) as a function
of the auxiliary function A, and changing variables from skills to incomes, allows us to rewrite this
expression as
ˆ y¯
y
T ′ (yi) yi
[
εDyi
φyi
A (yi) +
(
1− εDyi
) ˆ y¯
yi
ΠyiyjA (yj) dyj
]
fY (yi) dyi
=
ˆ y¯
y
[
T ′ (yi)
εDyi
φyi
yifY (yi)
]
A (yi) dyi +
ˆ y¯
y
[ˆ yi
y
T ′ (yj)
(
1− εDyj
)
ΠyjyiyjfY (yj) dyj
]
A (yi) dyi
where the second equality inverts the order of the two integrals. Finally, using (37), we can rewrite
the mechanical effect of the tax reform on government revenue as
ˆ y¯
y
Tˆ (yi) fY (yi) dyi =
ˆ y¯
y
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
ˆ y¯
yi
Πyi,yjA (yj) dyjfY (yi) dyi
=
ˆ y¯
y
[ˆ yi
y
(1− T ′ (yj)) yjΠyj ,yifY (yj) dyj
]{
ΩˆEyi +
ˆ y¯
y
Λyi,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk
}
dyi,
where in the last equality used (52) and inverted the order of integrals. Collecting the terms leads
to equation (40).
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